## MA111: Contemporary mathematics

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#### SCHEDULE:

- Participation quiz on BB should be done today (and take like 30 seconds)
- HW 1A is due Today, Sep 2nd, 2011.
- HW 1B-1F are due next Friday, Sep 9th, 2011. (That's a lot)
- Exam 1 is Monday, Sep 12th, during class.

Today we will look at how to simplify elections and check whether it is fair.

#### Review: Everybody is a winner

• Four kinds of winners: Majority, Condorcet, Plurality, Borda

 Not always a majority or Condorcet winner, but if there is, it seems unfair (or at least strange) for them to lose

Borda gives everyone points based on how they did; high score wins

Plurality just counts first place votes

#### What happens if we eliminate irrelevant candidates?

• If we just asked people for their first place votes (and they were honest), then C wouldn't get any votes. Why not get rid of C?

If the polls had only asked first place candidates,
 then C might not have even realized they had a chance!

• A only got 6 votes, so is not a real contender, right? DELETED.

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- With A gone, the 6 voters swing the election to B, and B wins
- In presidential primaries, candidates often drop out of the race as soon as they (or their financial backers) think they are going to lose
- If the voters themselves were steady in the opinions, then this would result in plurality with elimination

Secret poll before the elimination election. Who will win?

10	8	7	4
A	В	С	С
C	Α	В	Α
В	C	Α	В

• Secret poll before the elimination election. Who will win? A

10	Ω	7	1								
10	U	'			10	Ω	7	1	combine	12	11
Δ	R	$\mathcal{C}$	$\overline{}$	D look	10	0				10	тт
$\overline{}$	D	C	C	D IOST	Δ	Δ	$\mathcal{C}$	$\mathcal{C}$	combine	Δ	$\mathcal{C}$
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_	, ,	ט	<i>,</i> ,		$\mathcal{C}$	$\mathcal{C}$	Δ	Δ		$\mathcal{C}$	Δ
В	C	Α	В		_	_	, ,	, ,		_	, ,

• Secret poll before the elimination election. Who will win? A

• 4 voters on the end overhear the results, and change their mind:

Now who wins?

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• 4 voters on the end overhear the results, and change their mind:

- Now who wins? B wins!
- Voters tried to help A, but made A lose. This violates the monotonicity criterion.

• Plurality with elimination. Who will win based on this poll?

7	6	5
Α	В	С
В	C	Α
$\mathcal{C}$	Α	R

• Plurality with elimination. Who will win based on this poll? A

	6			7	6	_	
Δ	R	$\overline{C}$	Clost	1	U	5	$\rightarrow$ A wins 12 to 6
$\overline{}$	D	C	Clost	Α	R	Α	$\rightarrow$ A wins 12 to 6
В	C	Α	,				/ / ( Will 5 12 to 0
_		_		В	Α	В	
C	Α	В					

• Plurality with elimination. Who will win based on this poll? A

$$\begin{array}{c|ccccc}
7 & 6 & 5 \\
\hline
A & B & C \\
B & C & A \\
C & A & B
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c|cccccc}
7 & 6 & 5 \\
\hline
A & B & A \\
B & A & B
\end{array}$$

$$A wins 12 to 6$$

• 2 of B's supporters just give up and don't vote. Who wins?

7	4	5
Α	В	C
В	C	Α
C	Α	В

• Plurality with elimination. Who will win based on this poll? A

2 of B's supporters just give up and don't vote. Who wins? C

•	4	_		7	4	<u>ہ</u>	
Δ	R	$\overline{C}$	D look		+	5	$\rightarrow$ C wins 9 to 7
$\overline{}$	D	C	D IOST	Δ	$\mathcal{C}$	$\mathcal{C}$	$\rightarrow$ C wins 0 to 7
R	C	Δ	/	/ \	C	C	/ C WIII3 9 to 1
	C	٠,			Α		
$\mathcal{C}$	Λ	D			, ,	, ,	

• Plurality with elimination. Who will win based on this poll? A

2 of B's supporters just give up and don't vote. Who wins? C

By not voting at all, they got a better result (their 2nd place pick)

## A goofy Borda count

- For some reason A through Z all got nominated as candidates.
- 9 voters love A, and like B, and C-Z are like so whatever.
- 1 voter is obsessed with B, and decides to lie on his vote and give A his last place vote. What happens?

9	Ţ
Α	В
В	C
C	D
:	:
V	7

#### The results of one crazy voter

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9 1
A B
B C
C D
: : :
Y Z
Z A
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- A gets (9)(25) = 225 points, B gets (9)(24) + 25 = 241 points
- One (crazy) voter managed to change the entire election!
- This is only possible when the number of candidates is large compared to the number of voters (a pretty silly situation, but one faced by some small clubs)

## One crazy election

	13	12	0	3
	В	D	Α	D
• We've seen a lot of different "winners" here:	C	Α	C	C
	Α	C	В	В
	D	В	D	Α

Majority: none

Condorcet: A

Plurality with elimination: B

Borda: C

Plurality: D

#### Homework

- Vocab: Majority winner, Condorcet winner, Plurality winner, Borda winner
- Participation (15%): There is a quiz on blackboard, under Assignments. Should do it today. Due by Thursday.
- Read section 1.3 of the textbook.
- Online homework (30%):
  - 0B is due Today.
  - 1A is due Friday. Should do it today.